The present paper investigates the power of proper forcings to change the shape of the universe, in a certain well-defined respect. It turns out that the ranking among large cardinals can be used as a measure for that power. However, in order to establish the final result I had to isolate a new large cardinal concept, which I dubbed "remarkability." Let us approach the exact formulation of the problemand of its solution -at a slow pace.
and M has a unique iteration strategy for iteration trees of length < ∞ (I have borrowed the notation from [7] ). Then A ∞ implies that L(R) is absolute for setsized forcings; if there exists a measurable cardinal and L(R) is absolute for set-sized forcings then L(R) |= AD; and if L(R) |= AD then we don't quite get A ∞ , but a theorem of Woodin gives us an inner model with infinitely many Woodin cardinals (cf. [14] part III). Hence A ∞ as well as L(R) absoluteness for set-sized forcings are both very tightly connected to the consistency strength of AD.
A harder question, which goes beyond L(R) absoluteness for set-sized forcings, asks whether L(R) can provide a counterexample to the continuum hypothesis, i.e., whether θ L(R) can be larger than ω 2 , in the presence of large cardinals. (Recall that θ L(R) = sup{α | ∃f ∈ L(R) f : R → α onto }.) In 1991, Woodin settled this in the negative by showing that, for example, Martin's Maximum yields that δ 1 2 = ω 2 (cf. [15] Thm. 1.2).
However, Foreman and Magidor had shown prior to Woodin's result that (granted the existence of certain large cardinals) proper forcing cannot change the value of θ L(R) (cf. [3] ). Shelah had introduced proper forcing (cf. [11] ) as a fruitful unifying concept for which he could prove a very useful iteration lemma. Recall that a poset P ∈ V is called proper if for any α ≥ ω 1 and for every stationary S ⊂ [α]
ω do we have that P | |− "Š is stationary."
Having heard about [3] , Neeman and Zapletal found a strong generalization of the Foreman-Magidor result. They can show that A ∞ implies that L(R) is absolute for proper forcings in the stronger sense that for all proper posets P ∈ V , for all formulae φ, for all x ∈ R, and for all α ∈ OR do we have that
(cf. [7] and [8] ; Woodin pointed out later that this stronger form of L(R) absoluteness for proper forcings can smoothly be derived from [3] when combined with a theorem of his according to which L(R) is a symmetric extension of its HOD.) Woodin's above-mentioned result of 1991 in fact shows that "proper" can't be replaced by "semi-proper" here.
Is the conclusion of the Neeman-Zapletal theorem also tightly connected to the strength of AD? (After all, their use of A ∞ as a hypothesis seems very natural!) This question (and certain variations of it) has turned out to be an interesting one, as it leads towards the theory of coding into L (and, more generally, into core models). My main theorem, 1.3 below, will provide a straight answer to this question.
Let P ⊂ V be a class of posets. Let us say that L(R) is absolute for P-forcings if for all posets P ∈ P, for all formulae φ, and for all x ∈ R do we have that (1) above holds. We say that L(R) is "boldface" absolute for P-forcings if for all posets P ∈ P, for all formulae φ, for all x ∈ R, and for all α ∈ OR do we have that (2) above holds. (Notice that "boldface" L(R) absoluteness for P-forcings can only hold if no P ∈ P collapses ω 1 .)
The first main theorem of [7] even says that A ∞ implies L(R) is "boldface" absolute for reasonable forcings. The class of reasonable forcings, introduced by Foreman and Magidor in [3] , extends the class of proper ones. For P ∈ V to be reasonable it is only required that for any α ≥ ω 1 and for S = [α]
ω do we have that
On the other hand, in [9] I showed the following. Recall that a cardinal κ is called strong if for all regular cardinals θ ∈ OR there is some elementary embedding π: V → M with M transitive and critical point κ such that H θ ⊂ M. (Here, H θ is the set of all sets which are hereditarily smaller than θ.) Theorem 1.1 If L(R) is absolute for reasonable forcings then for every real x there is an inner model with a strong cardinal containing x.
As of today, the conclusion of 1.1 gives the best known lower bound for the strength of its assumption. Notice however that this conclusion implies that R is closed under ♯'s which by a theorem of Martin gives Π It is conjectured in [9] that L(R) absoluteness for reasonable forcings implies (at least) projective determinacy. On the other side, Kunen (unpublished) showed that L(R) absoluteness for c.c.c. forcings is equiconsistent with a weakly compact cardinal. In particular, L(R) absoluteness for c.c.c. forcings does not yield Π 1 1
determinacy.
It is open whether we may replace "reasonable" by "semi-proper" in the statements of 1.1 and 1.2. However, as pointed out in [9] , "stationary preserving" can replace "reasonable" in the statements of 1.1 and 1.2. Recall that a poset P ∈ V is called stationary preserving if for all stationary S ⊂ ω 1 do we have that
It might thus seem mildly plausible that working a bit harder should give that "reasonable" can also be replaced by "proper" in the statement of 1.2. Specifically, does ("boldface") L(R) absoluteness for proper forcings imply Π 1 1 determinacy? This is the problem referred to in the first paragraph of this paper.
The theorem which I shall now announce will provide a completely satisfactory answer to this question (cf. 1.5 below). 
and (d) ZF C+ there is a remarkable cardinal.
Here, item (c) states an anti-coding property, and it is the conclusion of the second main theorem of [7] ; (c) is of independent interest, but as a matter of fact we shall have to verify Con(c) ⇒ Con(d) when proving Con(a) ⇒ Con(d). Item (d) mentions the new large cardinal concept which I am advertizing here. We now finally want to see the official definition. , i.e., M ∈ N and N |= "M is the set of all sets which are hereditarily smaller thanθ."
We may view that cardinal whose existence is equiconsistent with L(R) absoluteness for P-forcings as a measure for the power of P-forcings to change the L(R)-part of the universe. With 1.3, we have arrived at the following picture. It is easy to verify that every remarkable cardinal has to be totally indescribable. It is also not hard to see that every remarkable cardinal κ is n-ineffable for every n < ω. (Recall that κ is called n-ineffable if every f : [κ] n+1 → 2 admits an fhomogeneous set X ⊂ κ which is stationary in κ.)
On the other hand, let κ be strong. If θ > κ is a regular cardinal then we may pickπ: V → M with M transitive and critical point κ such that
The following picture illustrates where the assertion that there is a remarkable cardinal sits in the consistency strength hierarchy on various weak large cardinal hypotheses (">" means "is consistency-wise stronger"). Notice that the existence of any of the cardinals listed is compatible with V = L.
The following lemma will give a very useful characterization of remarkability. Definition 1.6 Let κ be a cardinal. Let G be Col(ω, < κ)-generic over V , let θ > κ be a regular cardinal, and let
We say that X condenses remarkably if X = ran(π) for some elementary
where α = crit(π) < β < κ and β is a regular cardinal (in V
where Hθ is meant as describing the set of all sets which are hereditarily smaller than θ in the extension.
We should at least indicate how to prove the "only if" direction of 1.7. Let π, M,κ, σ, N, andθ be as in the statement of 1.4. In V we may pick g and g ′ such that g ′ ⊃ g, g is Col(ω, <κ)-generic over M, g ′ is Col(ω, < σ(κ))-generic over N, and σ extends toσ:
is a model of finite type withκ < ϑ <θ and ϑ regular in M, thenσ ↾ H
) condenses remarkably and is the universe of a submodel ofσ(M). By
knows that ran(σ ′ ) condenses remarkably and is the universe of a submodel ofσ(M). By pulling this statement back viaσ we conclude that in M[g],
ω : X condenses remarkably } is stationary.
Lifting up via π yields the displayed assertion in 1.7 (with θ replaced by ϑ).
Now that we are familiar with remarkable cardinals, let us turn towards sketching a proof of 1.3. We shall restrict ourselves to indicating the implications Con(d) ⇒ Con(b), Con(c) ⇒ Con(d), and Con(b) ⇒ Con(d). A full proof of 1.3 can be found in [10] .
We commence with Con(d) ⇒ Con(b). Let κ be a remarkable cardinal in V , and let G be Col(ω, < κ)-generic over V . We claim that V [G] is a model of "boldface" L(R) absoluteness for proper forcings.
The key observation here is the following. Suppose that Q is a proper poset in
, andẋ H = x. Using 1.7 as well as the fact that Q is proper we may pick some elementary embedding
where α = crit(π) < β < κ, and β is a regular cardinal in V . It is easy to see that x =xH, whereH isQ-generic over H
We may hence set Q x = Col(ω, < α) ⋆Q, and
We may express this fact by saying that all the reals of further proper set-generic extensions are "small generic" over V . This enables us to get a "normal form," i.e., we can now make the set of such reals the reals of some Levy collapse of κ (cf.
[1] p. 1385). Namely, let E be Col(ω, (2
. We can easily define a sequence (α i , G i : i < ω) such that for all i < ω do we have that
As Col(ω, < κ) has the κ-c.c., it follows that
We may then use the homogeneity of the Levy collapse to get that, for any formula φ, for all x ∈ R ∩ V [G], and for all α ∈ OR do we have that
This proves that V [G] is a model of "boldface" L(R) absoluteness for proper forcings. The method used here can be exploited for getting the following.
Theorem 1.8 (Derived model theorem)
Assume that every real is set-generic over L, and that L(R) is absolute for proper forcings. Then (in some set-generic extension of V ) there is G being Col(ω, < ω
Let us now turn towards Con(c) ⇒ Con(d). In order to establish this implication we shall prove that unless ω V 1 is remarkable in L we can "code" any A ⊂ OR "into" L(R) in the sense that A ends up as an element of the L(R) of some proper set-generic extension. We aim to discuss this implication from a somewhat abstract point of view. Let us call a pair ( a, B) robust if
• a = (a i : i < ω 1 ) is an ω 1 sequence of (pairwise) almost disjoint subsets of ω, • B ⊂ ω 1 , and • there is some F : α<ω 1 P(α) → R with P | |− "F ∈ L(Ṙ)" for all posets P being c.c.c., and such that a i = F (B ∩ i) for all i < ω 1 .
Let ( a, B) be robust. By almost disjoint forcing (cf. [4] p. 85 ff.) we may add a ⊂ ω to V such that for all i < ω 1 do we have that i ∈ B ⇔ a ∩ a i is finite. Said forcing has the c.c.c., so that an easy recursion can be run inside
). Suppose now we want to "code" some given A ⊂ OR "into" L(R) in the above sense. We may assume w.l.o.g. that A ⊂ ω 1 by first forcing with some Col(ω 1 , λ), λ > ω 1 , if necessary. As a matter of fact, we should search for a robust ( a, B) in some proper set-generic extension where, say, A = B even = {i: 2i ∈ B}. The function F witnessing ( a, B) is robust will be obtained from inner model theory; specifically, we plan on setting F (B ∩ i) = the < L[B∩i] -least b ⊂ ω which is almost disjoint from any element of {a j : j < i}, if it exists, and F (B ∩ i) = ∅ else. Here,
In order for this to work we just need that L[B ∩ i] |= "i is countable," for every i < ω 1 . Such a B ⊂ ω 1 is called reshaped. It is consistent even with ¬0
♯ that V doesn't contain a reshaped subset of ω 1 . (Example: V = L Col(ω,<κ) where κ is weakly compact in L.) However, the point is that we can force a reshaped B ⊂ ω 1 by a proper forcing -provided that ω • p: i → 2 for some i < ω 1 , and
|= "j is countable" for all j ≤ i. This is Jensen's "reshaping" (cf. [4] p. 90 f., and [2] ). The upshot now is that if ω 1 is not remarkable in L then P is actually proper. (This fact is in want of a non-trivial proof which uses the key characterization 1.7 above. We emphasize that, on the other hand, reshaping is not proper if V = L Col(ω,<κ) where κ is remarkable in L.) After having forced with P , let us finally force Martin's Axiom MA, by some c.c.c. forcing. Let W denote the final generic extension.
Let R ⊂ ω 1 be a reshaped element of W . With A ⊂ ω 1 being our initially given set, we have that B = A ⊕ R is reshaped, too. If we let F ↾ {B ∩ i: i < ω 1 } be the function defined as above then F will witness ( a, B) is robust for a = (F (B ∩ i): i < ω 1 ). As almost disjoint coding has the c.c.c., and W |= MA, we thus get that ( a, B) ∈ L(R W ); in particular, A ∈ L(R W ). Thus if ω 1 is not remarkable in L then any A ⊂ OR can be "coded into" L(R) by some proper set forcing.
Let us now finally take a look at Con(a) ⇒ Con(d). The above argument can be easily varied to give a proof of this. Instead of forcing MA in the end, we may as well produce -under the assumption that ω 1 is not remarkable in L -a proper set generic extension W ′ in which there is a reshaped good B ⊂ ω 1 , and the continuum hypothesis holds. We can then use almost disjoint forcing to obtain a further extension in which R ⊂ L[a] for some real a, i.e., in which there is a ∆
